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WATER LAWSPORHASE v. NEBRASKA
WATER LAW-COMMERCE CLAUSE-The U.S. Supreme Court
holds that a Nebraska statute prohibiting the export of groundwater
to a state not granting reciprocal rights to transport water into Nebraska violates the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. Sporhase
v. Nebraska, - U.S.

-,

102 s. Ct. 3456 (1982).

INTRODUCTION
One of the most serious problems facing the arid West is the scarcity
of water. The lack of precipitation in this area of the nation has forced
the western states to depend heavily on groundwater resources. In recent
years, due to the West's continued dramatic growth in population, the
demand for water in many areas has exceeded the supply.
The Ogallala Aquifer provides the water for the high plains of Texas,
New Mexico, Colorado, Oklahoma, Kansas, and Nebraska. The aquifer
is overdrafted resulting in a steady depletion of recoverable water. ' Overdrafting eventually will result in complete exhaustion of the aquifer. This
depletion could cause serious economic problems for many western states.2
Compared to other western states, Nebraska is rich in groundwater.'
Therefore, while most states with more limited groundwater supplies have
enacted relatively comprehensive laws which provide a basis for resolving
major groundwater policy issues, Nebraska has postponed major legislative decisions. However, recent rapid development of Nebraska groundwater has created user conflicts forcing law makers to consider water
policy issues. In response to this growing concern over the depletion of
groundwater, Nebraska undertook a systematic revision of its water management and conservation laws. A major element of the revision was a
Nebraska statute requiring any person intending to withdraw water from
a well located in Nebraska to apply to the Department of Water Resources
for a permit to do so. 4 The permit would be granted only if two basic
conditions were met. First, the person seeking to remove groundwater
1. Overdrafting is the extraction of groundwater in excess of the net recharge of the aquifer over
a long period of wet and dry years constituting a climatic cycle. Ground Water Manual, Government
Printing Office 4 (1981).
2. Recently Congress authorized a study of the Ogallala Aquifer, based upon the depletion caused
by the increase in the use of irrigation in the West. Pub. L. No. 94-587 § 193, 90 Stat. 2943 (1976),
codifed as 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-18 (1976). In Nebraska 72% of irrigation water withdrawals comes
from groundwater. Aiken, Nebraska Ground Water Law andAdministration, 59 NEB. L. REV. 917,
985 (1980)ff. Eighty-seven percent of groundwater in Nebraska is used for irrigation. The source
of irrigation well and irrigation acreage figures is the well registration data compiled in the Nebraska
Natural Resources Commission Data Bank Information System (NRC Data Bank). Id. at 918.
3. Id.
4. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978).
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from Nebraska had to show that the withdrawal was reasonable, not
contrary to the conservation and use of groundwater, and not otherwise
detrimental to the public welfare. This was referred to as the "conservation" requirement. Second, the state in which the water was to be used
had to grant reciprocal rights to withdraw and transport groundwater from
that state for use in Nebraska. This was termed the "reciprocity" requirement.'
Sporhase, a farmer, owned contiguous tracts of land in Nebraska and
Colorado. He applied to the Colorado Ground Water Commission to
appropriate water to irrigate his land in Colorado. 6 Colorado denied the
application on grounds that the aquifer at the proposed location was
overappropriated. Sporhase then invested a large sum of money to install
underground pipelines and irrigation equipment to pump water from a
well located in Nebraska, only a few feet from the Nebraska-Colorado
state line, to irrigate his agricultural land in Colorado. The Department
of Water Resources, upon receipt of a complaint, informed Sporhase that
he was exporting water out of Nebraska into Colorado in violation of the
Nebraska statute requiring -a permit and that the Department intended to
enforce the law against him.
Nebraska sued Sporhase in the Nebraska State Court to enjoin him
from irrigating the Colorado land from his Nebraska well. Sporhase defended, contending that the Nebraska statute violated the commerce clause
of the U.S. Constitution and therefore should not be enforced. Both the
Nebraska District Court and the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Nebraska statute, including the mandatory reciprocity requirement. 7
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision, rejected the
State's argument of public ownership of groundwater and held that
groundwater is an article of commerce and therefore subject to Congressional regulation. Once this issue was decided, the Court had no difficulty
in concluding that the reciprocity requirement of the Nebraska statute
violated the commerce clause by imposing an impermissible burden on
interstate commerce.
BACKGROUND
The Court has always recognized conservation of natural resources as
a legitimate state function. Water, compared to other resources, holds a
special regulated position, especially in the arid states of the West. Competing demands for scarce water resources have resulted in the equitable
5. Id.
6. Colorado Ground Water Commission File No. AD-6826.
7. Nebraska v. Sporhase, 208 Neb. 703, 305 N.W.2d 614 (1981).
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apportionment of surface water of interstate streams among the western
states. 8 Implicit in the compacts apportioning interstate water is the assumption that each state has the exclusive right to allocate the waters so
apportioned9 and likewise prohibit the diversion of apportioned water for
use in adjoining states.'"
The legal fiction of "public ownership" of a state's natural resource
has been largely struck down as a pretense for discriminatory regulation
of the resource. Nevertheless, in some western states, including Nebraska,
groundwater is considered to be owned by the state and the "property"
interest of a water user or water rights recipient is qualified by the state.
Under this theory, water is always subject to state control and never
becomes a private possession. When disputes are relatively infrequent,
litigation is an efficient means of conflict resolution. However, when
water supplies are inadequate to supply all potential users, conflicts are
predictably frequent and administrative resolution is more efficient and
effective than private litigation."
The development of western groundwater law reflects the earlier development of surface water law. The doctrine of prior appropriation has
been applied to both surface and groundwater. In the states overlying the
Ogllala Aquifer, water is a precious and limited resource and prior appropriation dominates groundwater regulation in this area. The right to
use groundwater is based on obtaining a state permit to withdraw the
water, the physical withdrawal of groundwater, and the use of groundwater for some beneficial purpose. 2
Although the prior appropriation doctrine has been codified in most
western states, some states with relatively abundant supplies of water
employ a commonlaw groundwater allocation theory. These states follow
what is termed the "English Rule." In Texas, for example, groundwater,
once appropriated, is a privately owned resource. The overlying landowner may use all the percolating water he can capture for beneficial
purposes on or off his land. The owner may sell the water as he does
8. The Colorado River Compact, approved by Congress in Section 12(a) of the Boulder Canyon
Project Act, 45 Stat. 1057, 43 U.S.C. § 617; Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963)(opinion),
757 (1964)(decree); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945)(opinion), 325 U.S. 665 (1945)(decree).
9. Wyoming v. Colorado, 353 U.S. 953 (1957). In that decree, Colorado was enjoined from
developing more than a total of 49,373 acre-feet of water from the Laramie River and its tributaries.
Of this amount no more than 19,875 acre-feet could be diverted "for use in Colorado at any or all
points outside of the [Laramie River] basin." The remainder of the water apportioned to Colorado,
including any of the 19,875 acre-feet not diverted out of the basin, was limited to use on lands in
Colorado specified in the decree.
10. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 400 (1943); Weiland v. Pioneer Ifr. Co., 259 U.S. 498,
502-03 (1922); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
11. See Trelease, Law, Water, and People; the Role of Water Law in Conserving and Developing
Natural Resources in the West, 18 WYO. L.J. 3 (1963).
12. State v. Dority, 55 N.M. 12, 225 P.2d 1007 (1950); e.g. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-2 (1978).
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other property. Texas does
not regulate or otherwise control the use or
13
quantity of groundwater.
Forced uniformity in water regulation is impractical in states with
divergent water resources and needs. Indeed, state exercise of control
over groundwater without challenge from the federal government constitutes defacto recognition of the state primacy in this area. Only in the
context of an overriding national interest, such as water pollution control,
has federal authority preempted state primacy over groundwater. 14
A statute restricting the export of water from a state, however, promotes
"resource isolation."' 5 Resource isolation schemes present examples of
state regulations which burden interstate commerce. Even though these
statutory regulations may serve legitimate local purposes, they do so
without regard to less discriminatory alternatives. They burden interstate
commerce by preventing certain resources from even entering interstate
commerce. 16
Invariably, the Supreme Court has required state laws which effectively
isolate natural resources from the national economy to meet a stricter
commerce clause test than other state laws. This is especially true when
a facially discriminatory statute requires reciprocity by a sister state as a
condition on the export of the resource to make its application evenhanded. 7 Thus, a statute imposing a reciprocity requirement on the export
of water will be closely scrutinized under the commerce clause power.
The purpose of the commerce clause is to encourage a national market
for all resources or goods and to encourage maximum efficiency in the
use of those resources. The Supreme Court, in Sporhase, directly addressed the issue of whether the mandatory reciprocity requirement of
the Nebraska statute was hostile to this policy.
SPORHASE V. NEBRASKA, THE MAJORITY OPINION
The term "commerce" implies that a commodity must be capable of
being reduced to private possession and then exchanged for goods or
services of the same or similar economic value.' 8 Nebraska argued that
groundwater is not an article of commerce because it is not a marketable
13. F. TRELEASE, WATER LAW 467 (2d ed. 1974).
14. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 51, § 101(9) (1972).
15. West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co. 221 U.S. 229 (191 l)(invalidating an Oklahoma statute
prohibiting the shipment of natural gas outside the state); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S.
553 (1923)(prohibiting West Virginia's attempt to prevent natural gas pipeline companies from
shipping natural gas out of the state until all local needs were met).
16. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
17. Colorado does not freely permit transfer of groundwater outside its boundaries. COLO. REV.
STAT. § 37-81-101 (1973).
18. Nebraska v. Sporhase, 305 N.W.2d at 616.
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item freely transferable for value among private parties.' 9 Because Nebraska claimed a greater ownership interest in groundwater than in certain
other natural resources, it argued that it could legitimately use the grant
of the state's police power to conserve this essential natural resource.
Nebraska relied on Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarterfor authority. 20
In that case, petitioners challenged a New Jersey statute which prohibited
the interstate transfer of surface water located within the state. The Hudson
County Water Department had contracted to supply a borough of New
York City with water from a New Jersey river. Justice Holmes upheld
the statute, ruling the state's interest in preserving its water was well
within its police power.2'
The Sporhase Court, however, relied upon City of Altus v. Carr,22 a
more recent case which invalidated a Texas statute that prohibited interstate exportation of groundwater without prior approval of the Texas
legislature on the grounds that such restrictions violated the commerce
clause. City of Altus should not control in Sporhase, however, because
the Texas water system is unique in the West. A Texas landowner has the
right to sell water, and the transfer of water, a private commodity in
Texas, falls under the authority of the commerce clause. In most western
states, including Nebraska, landowners have no comparable right because
water is not privately owned. Therefore, the City of Altus decision that
interstate transportation of privately owned water cannot be prohibited
because it is an article of commerce is not necessarily inconsistent with
the Nebraska State Court ruling that approved the prohibition on interstate
transfer of state owned water.
The Supreme Court found that both the Nebraska decision and Hudson
were proposing a public ownership theory only to rationalize state regulation over transportation of groundwater. The Court noted that the
Hudson decision was based on Geer v. Connecticut23 which allowed the
state to qualify the personal ownership of captured game birds. In 1979,
Hughes v. Oklahoma24 overruled Geer by prohibiting a ban on the interstate transfer of a natural resource, minnows. 25
The Court, therefore, faced the issue of whether water, like other natural
resources, should be classified as an article of commeice subject to
Congressional regulation. Nebraska relied upon its strict regulation of
intrastate transfer of water to support its policy that groundwater is pub19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 618.
209 U.S. 349 (1908).
Id. at 354.
255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex. 1966), affid mem., 385 U.S. 35 (1966).
161 U.S. 519 (1896).
441 U.S. 322 (1979).
See supra note 15.
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lically owned and thus not an article of commerce for private trade .26 The
Court rejected this distinction between private and public ownership,
concluding that the transfer of water in all states is subject to some degree
of state regulation which does not depend upon public ownership of the
controlled commodity.
Nebraska also sought to distinguish water from other natural resources
by arguing that the state has an overriding interest in conserving a resource
essential for the survival of its citizens. The Court found that, although
water is indeed essential for human survival, over 80 percent of water
supplies are used for agricultural purposes. 27 Agricultural markets are
nationwide. Therefore, the Court found this case presents an archetypical
example of the commerce among the several states for which the framers
of the Constitution intended to authorize federal regulation.
Nebraska further argued that its water statute was a legitimate exercise
of the state's police power to protect the health of its citizens and to
conserve natural resources. To determine the validity of a state statute
which affects interstate commerce, the Court must ask what the statute's
purpose is and whether there is a close fit between the means and the
purpose. 8 Nebraksa's stated purpose was to conserve and preserve the
diminishing sources of groundwater. That purpose was consistently supported by other state water regulations. The first three conditions in the
challenged statute promote Nebraska's conservation goals; 29 they do not
impose an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. 3° In the fourth
requirement,31 however, the Court found an explicit barrier to commerce
between the states.32
The State bore the initial burden of demonstrating a close fit between
the reciprocity requirement and the asserted local purpose. The Court
found no evidence that the reciprocity restriction was tailored to the
conservation and preservation rationale. Therefore, the reciprocity requirement did not survive the "strict scrutiny" reserved for facially discriminatory legislation.
Finally, Nebraska argued that Congress had granted the states permission to engage in what would otherwise be impermissible groundwater
26. Nebraska does allow the transfer of water from rural to metropolitan areas, yet the transferor
is permitted to charge only for costs of distribution and not for the water itself. Other states which
do not espouse this public ownership theory allow the transferor to charge for the value of the water.
27. Sporhase, 102 S.Ct. at 3462.
28. Pile v. Bruce Church, 398 U.S. 137 (1970); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
29. The first three requirements are:
1) That the person seeking to remove groundwater from Nebraska had to show that
the withdrawal was reasonable,
2) not contrary to the use and conservation of groundwater, and,
3) not otherwise detrimental to public welfare.
30. Sporhase, 102 S.Ct. at 3464.
31. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-618.01 (1978).
32. Sporhase, 102 S.Ct. at 3465.
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regulation. Congress has deferred to western states' water law schemes
in which the states regulate the appropriation and use of water. There are
thrity-seven federal statutes and a number of interstate compacts demonstrating Congressional deference to state water law." Relevant sections
of the statutes contain language defining the extent of the federal legislation's preemptive effect on state law and mandating that questions of
water rights which arise in relation to a federal project are to be determined
in accordance with state law. Congress has full authority under the commerce clause to confer such power upon the states. 3"
The Court, finding that Nebraska's reciprocity scheme was an "unreasonable burden," concluded that where Congress has consented to
"unreasonable burdens on commerce," Congress' intent to protect state
legislation from attack under the commerce clause is "expressly stated."
There was no evidence there "that Congress consented to the unilateral
imposition of the unreasonable burden on commerce" '35 resulting from
the reciprocity requirement of the Nebraska statute; therefore, the statute
was unconstitutional under the commerce clause.
THE DISSENT
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist36 chastised the majority for its unnecessarily broad holding that water is an article of commerce. Congress can
regulate groundwater if it has a substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce even though groundwater is not considered an article of commerce. Labeling water as an article of commerce was an unfortunate
extension beyond the facts of this case. Justice Rehnquist argued that the
only issue before the Court was "whether the existence of the Commerce
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, by itself, in the absence of any action
by Congress, invalidates some or all of Section 46-613.01 of the Nebraska
Revised Statute which relates to groundwater. ' 37 The Majority approached this problem in a traditional commerce clause analysis in which
the State's "interests" were weighed against the interests of the free flow
of interstate commerce. In adopting such an approach, Rehnquist felt the
Majority ignored past decisions recognizing the traditional authority of a
33. For example, the Reclamation Act of 1902, 32 Stat. 390 reads:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intending to affect or to in any
way interfere with the laws of any State or territory relating to the control, appropriation,
use or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder,
and the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of this Act, shall proceed
in conformity with such laws ...
Subsequent laws have contained similar language.
34. Lewis v. B.T. Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980).
35. Sporhase, 102 S.Ct. at 3466.
36. Justice O'Connor joined in Rehnquist's dissent. Interestingly, both Justices are from Arizona,
a state which will undoubtedly be affected by the majority opinion.
37. Sporhase, 102 S.Ct. at 3467.
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state over the state resources necessary for the well-being of its citizens.
In the exercise of this authority, the State may regulate a natural resource
so as to preclude that resource from attaining the status of an "article of
commerce."
The dissent distinguished the cases which invalidated restrictive legislation of a state's natural resources from the case at bar. The Majority
relied upon the private market cases of West v. Kansas NaturalGas Co.,38
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia39 and City of Altus v. Carr4 ° to support its
conclusions. These cases have three common elements: 1) they involved
the sale of a commodity which was privately owned; 2) there was an
existing private interstate market for that commodity; and 3) the sole
purpose of the state legislation was to protect private in-state business,
markets and interests.
In contrast, the Nebraska statute shares characteristics common to water
law systems of most of the western states. Water is treated as a public
asset. Appropriators are merely given the right to use the water for beneficial purposes. There is no private interstate market for water and the
goal of regulation is to protect existing water supplies. The Nebraska law
prohibits "commerce" in water to exist, intrastate or interstate. The dissenters concluded that the Nebraska statute was evenhanded, neither discriminating against nor burdening interstate commerce.
CONCLUSION
The Court's announcement that water is an article of commerce has a
far-reaching effect on water regulation in the arid western states for two
reasons. First, the decision glosses over the public-versus-private ownership distinction of groundwater, a distinction critical in the water dispute
between New Mexico and El Paso. 4 Second, while absolute bans on
water export have been made virtually impossible, the Court acknowledged as legitimate the conservation component of the statute, even though
the conservation requirements applied only to out-of-state users. The
38. Kansas Natural Gas, supra note 15.
39. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, supra note 15.
40. 255 F. Supp. 828, supra note 22.
41. City of El Paso v. Reynolds, No. 80-730HB (D.N.M. filed Jan. 17, 1983). El Paso sought
a declaration that all New Mexico laws which prohibit the export of New Mexico water violate the
dormant commerce clause. Texas has chosen to treat water as a private commodity, subjecting it to
the constraints of the commerce clause. However, groundwater in New Mexico is Publically owned
and subject to elaborate governmental controls. Such a distinction, however, was ignored by Judge
Bratton when he ruled in favor of El Paso in January 1983. Shortly thereafter, the New Mexico
legislature enacted an emergency amendment to the statute prohibiting the export of water beyond
the borders of New Mexico. Senate Bill 295 (Approved Feb. 22, 1983). New Mexico claims now
that Judge Bratton's decision is moot. El Paso is challenging the new statute again on grounds that
the restrictions impose an impermissible burden on interstate commerce.
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Court offered some guidance on when discrimination in a statute governing water export may be tolerated.42
The Court was less sympathetic with the Nebraska statute's reciprocity
requirement, but the Court suggested that the burden of demonstrating a
close fit between a statute's means and its asserted local purpose is not
insurmountable. "A demonstrably ard state conceivably might be able
to marshall evidence to establish a close means-end relationship between
a total ban on the exportation of water and a purpose to conserve and
preserve water.",4 3 Thus, Sporhase did not conclusively resolve litigation
over water rights in other western states. Other states may argue that their
export bans are more legitimate than Nebraska's.
After the Sporhase decision, broad or all-encompassing bans on water
export will be nearly impossible to sustain. However, the general framework for the regulation of water supplies in the western states is still
intact. Interstate compacts and equitable apportionment statutes may well
withstand the Sporhase decision. Furthermore, a positive effect of the
decision is that state legislatures will be more cautious in narrowly tailoring new water legislation to the important goal of resource conservation.
MARY ANN GREEN

42. First, legislation aimed at protecting the health of the state's citizens was said to be distinguishable from legislation designed to protect the state's economy. Second, states have a legal
expectation (fostered by equitable apportionment decrees and interstate compacts) that state boundaries may legitimately be recognized in the allocation of water. Third, the state's claim to public
ownership of groundwater may support a limited preference for its own citizens.
43. Sporhase, 102 S.Ct. at 3465.

